K6.2. As Implemented
301. |
In relation to striking out, CPR 3.4(2)
provides :- |
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"The court may
strike out a statement of case if it appears to the court - |
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(a) |
that the statement of
case discloses no reasonable grounds for bringing or defending the claim; |
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(b) |
that the statement of
case is an abuse of the court's process or is otherwise likely to obstruct the just
disposal of the proceedings; or |
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(c) |
that there has been a
failure to comply with a rule, practice direction or court order." |
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Under paragraph (a), to survive a striking out
application, a claim or a defence must be more than merely arguable - they must rest on
reasonable grounds. |
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Paragraph (b) maintains the court's inherent
jurisdiction to strike out proceedings which are an abuse. |
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However, under paragraph (c), the English
Court of Appeal (Note 246) has stressed that a striking out should not be the first port of call where
there has been non-compliance with time-limits or other rules or orders. Many other
available alternatives exist and should first be considered. |
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303. |
In the context of setting aside default
judgments, the present distinction between judgments that have been regularly and
irregularly obtained has been maintained. Where a judgment has been obtained without due
observance of specified rules, the court must set it aside.(Note 247) In other cases, the court has a discretion and may set aside or vary the
judgment applying the "real prospect of success" test :- |
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"(a) |
the defendant has a
real prospect of successfully defending the claim; or |
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(b) |
it appears to the court
that there is some other good reason why - |
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(i) |
the judgment should be
set aside or varied; or |
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(ii) |
the defendant should be
allowed to defend the claim." (Note
248) |
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304. |
Summary judgments are dealt with by Part 24
which establishes "a procedure by which the court may decide a claim or a particular
issue without a trial." (Note 249) |
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305. |
The test is again the real prospect of success
test, applicable either to the plaintiff's or the defendant's case and formulated as
follows :- |
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"The court may
give summary judgment against a claimant or defendant on the whole of a claim or on a
particular issue if - |
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(i) |
that claimant has no
real prospect of succeeding on the claim or issue; or |
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(ii) |
that defendant has no
real prospect of successfully defending the claim or issue; and |
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(b) |
there is no other
compelling reason why the case or issue should be disposed of at a trial." (Note 250) |
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306. |
This is on its face a less stringent test than
presently exists in Hong Kong under Order 14 or Order 18 r 19. The House of Lords took
comfort in the availability of this broader power as a means of dispatching unmeritorious
claims which disgruntled clients might be tempted to institute against their barristers
following loss by advocates of their immunity from suit as a result of Arthur J S Hall
& Co v Simons [2000] 3 WLR 543. |
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306.1 |
Lord Steyn states :- |
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"Unmeritorious
claims against barristers will be struck out. The new Civil Procedure Rules 1999, have
made it easier to dispose summarily of such claims: rules 3.4(2)(a) and 24.2." (Note 251) |
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306.2 |
Lord Hoffmann puts it as follows :- |
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"Under the old
rules, a defendant faced with what appeared to be a bad claim had a very heavy burden to
satisfy the court that it was 'frivolous and vexatious' and ought to be struck out. Now
rule 24.2 provides that the court may give summary judgment in favour of a defendant if it
considers that 'the claimant has no real prospect of succeeding on the claim.' The
defendant may file written evidence in support of his application. In Swain v Hillman,
(Note 252)
Lord Woolf MR encouraged judges to make use of this 'very salutary power ... It saved
expense; it achieved expedition; it avoided the court's resources being used up in cases
where it would serve no purpose; and, generally, was in the interests of justice.' " (Note 253) |
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307. |
However, it has been suggested (Note 254) that the new rules have had little impact, possibly because elaboration of the
"real prospect of success" test by Lord Woolf in Swain v Hillman
(applied in subsequent cases) has meant that such test does not significantly differ from
the test previously applicable. Lord Woolf stated :- |
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"Under r 24.2, the
court now has a very salutary power, both to be exercised in a claimant's favour or, where
appropriate, in a defendant's favour. It enables the court to dispose summarily of both
claims or defences which have no real prospect of being successful. The words 'no real
prospect of being successful or succeeding' do not need any amplification, they speak for
themselves. The word 'real' distinguishes fanciful prospects of success or, as Mr Bidder
QC submits, they direct the court to the need to see whether there is a 'realistic' as
opposed to a 'fanciful' prospect of success." (Note 255) |
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If one can succeed
summarily only where the other side's case is "fanciful", one may well ask
whether this differs from requiring the other side's case to be unarguable or less than
triable. On the other hand, the citation of Lord Hoffmann above clearly shows that his
Lordship considered the present test to impose a lighter burden than that previously
applicable.
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308. |
In any event, the learned editors of the White
Book point out that the "real prospect of success" test does not require a
plaintiff or defendant to show that his claim or defence will probably succeed at trial.
It may have a real prospect of success even if it is improbable, although in such a case,
the court may allow the case to proceed subject to the imposition of conditions. (Note 256) |
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309. |
The rules envisage the possibility, in
exceptional cases, of oral evidence being permitted (by order of the court) within the
summary procedure. Written evidence is generally permitted.(Note 257) |
Notes
246 |
Biguzzi v Rank
Leisure plc [1999] 1 WLR 1926. <back> |
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247 |
CPR 13.2. <back> |
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248 |
CPR 13.3. <back> |
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249 |
CPR 24.1. Special
provisions applicable to defamation claims are dealt with by CPR 53.2 made necessary by
the right to trial by jury. <back> |
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250 |
CPR 24.2. <back> |
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251 |
At 554. <back> |
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252 |
The Times, 4 November
1999; Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Transcript No 1732 of 1999. <back> |
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253 |
At 562-3. <back> |
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254 |
Harry Anderson, Herbert
Smith, Conference on "Civil Procedure: Latest Developments and Prospects of
Change" Hong Kong on 8 June 2001. <back> |
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255 |
The House of Lords in
Three Rivers District Council and others v Bank of England (No 3) [2001] 2 All ER 513
cited this test with apparent approval. See also Royal Brompton Hospital National
Health Service Trust v Hammond [2001] EWCA Civ 550 (11 April 2001). <back> |
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256 |
White Book 24.2.3.
Conditions may be imposed pursuant to CPR 3.1(3), as indicated in CPR 24.6. <back> |
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257 |
White Book 24.5.2.
<back> |
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