332. |
The HCR contain a timetable for litigation, specifying the
periods by which sequences of litigation events ought to occur. The timetable is, however,
not observed in practice. |
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332.1 |
The rules say that discovery is to take place automatically
and without order of the court within 14 days after the pleadings in the action are deemed
to be closed, (Note 288) but if the
parties do not take the necessary steps, nothing happens unless and until the matter is
brought before the court for an order that such steps be taken. |
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332.2 |
The same is true of the rule (Note 289)
stipulating that within a month after close of pleadings a summons for directions be taken
out "with a view to providing ...... an occasion for the consideration by the Court
of the preparation for the trial of the action, so that (a) all matters which must or can
be dealt with on interlocutory applications ...... may so far as possible be dealt with,
and (b) such directions may be given as to the future course of the action as appear best
adapted to secure the just, expeditious and economical disposal thereof." However,
unless and until one or other of the parties takes out this summons, the court does not
get to give the case any such consideration. |
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332.3 |
When eventually the summons for directions is heard (at a 3
minute hearing), the practice is generally for the various orders sought to be made except
for the direction setting down the case for trial. The court adjourns the case to a
further "listing hearing" at which the court checks to see that the outstanding
preparations have in fact been attended to. If not, the setting of a date for trial is
again deferred. |
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332.4 |
When preparations are finally thought to be complete, the
listing master gives the parties permission to set the case down for trial. It is only
then that the case is listed, on attendance before the Clerk of the Court, either in the
fixture list (which, unless particular cause is shown, is reserved for trials estimated to
run for 6 days or more) or in the running list (for trials estimated to last less than 6
days). |
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333. |
The present system obviously allows delays to result from the
parties' own lack of readiness for trial. While many parties and their lawyers
conscientiously press cases ahead without delay, the party or lawyer who wants to drag his
feet can easily bring about substantial delays. In any event, it is clear that the
timetables prescribed by the HCR are generally ignored and that the periods prescribed by
the rules for particular steps in the action far exceeded. Several factors contribute to
this. |
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333.1 |
First, the timetable involves standards set in the rules and
not tailor-made to take into account the needs of particular cases. There is therefore,
perhaps understandably, a tendency to regard the time limits as optimal standards
appropriate to simple cases and an assumption that longer limits in reality apply. |
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333.2 |
Secondly, as indicated above, where a time limit set by the
rules is ignored, nothing happens unless and until the other party decides to compel
compliance. This involves effort and expense. In practice, quite reasonably with a view to
avoiding the costs of a hearing, the party who wants the case to progress will write,
often more than once, requiring the other party to take the necessary step and threatening
an application to the court if this is not done. During such correspondence, the case
usually makes no progress. |
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333.3 |
Thirdly, where it proves necessary to take out an
interlocutory application, a certain waiting period for a hearing is inevitable. Not
infrequently, a recalcitrant party will consent to the order sought only at the door of
the judge's or master's chambers and after several weeks of delay have been incurred. |
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333.4 |
Fourthly, whatever their clients may wish about the speedy
disposal of a case, lawyers may often be prepared to accommodate each other with agreed
extensions of time. This often suits both sets of legal representatives, particularly
where they are heavily engaged on other matters. These are extensions agreed without any
incentive or requirement to "catch up" on the progress of a case by speeding up
events thereafter. |
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333.5 |
Fifthly, the court has tended to be lenient and, certainly at
the first hearing, has tended to grant an extension of time on slender justification for
the failure to comply with the rules. Sometimes the leniency is plainly excessive, with
repeated extensions being granted. |
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333.6 |
Sixthly, the court has tended to give very great (and often
excessive) weight to ensuring that the parties are completely ready for the trial,
refusing to set down a case for trial or vacating the trial date where, for instance, one
party is not ready with an expert report or has not obtained an advice on evidence from
counsel, notwithstanding that such deficiency was of that party's or his lawyers' own
making. |
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334. |
Underlying this unsatisfactory state of affairs is the
adversarial design of the civil justice system which leaves it entirely up to the parties
to progress the case without any time tables set or enforced by the court. Moreover,
viewing itself as the impartial umpire, the court has adopted the policy of putting off
the trial until it is sure that the parties are both quite ready to do battle. |
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335. |
The desire to ensure that the parties are ready is laudable.
It makes for procedural fairness and avoids adjournments after the start of the trial.
However, the approach described above unfortunately allows a defendant who is playing for
time ample latitude to put off his trial by months or even years. In such cases, it also
runs up costs since enforcing each procedural obligation requires action by lawyers, by
correspondence and/or applications to the court. Although the dilatory defendant may have
interlocutory costs orders made against him, these are usually made "in any
event", meaning that they do not need to be paid until after completion of the trial
and so provide little deterrence. |