K14.4. Deterring unnecessary or abusive interlocutory
applications
(a) |
Summary assessment of costs |
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451. |
An important feature of the Woolf reforms
involves use of the court's power to make a summary assessment of costs after hearing an
interlocutory application, with such costs ordered to be paid forthwith. This saves the
effort and cost of a detailed taxation, but, more importantly, has become widely regarded
as a general deterrent against making interlocutory applications that may not be
necessary. It is certainly also an appropriate sanction to discourage abusive use of
interlocutory applications. |
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452. |
A similar power, referred to as a power to
make a gross sum assessment of costs, existed previously in England and Wales and is
presently provided for in Hong Kong by HCR O 62 r 9(4)(b). (Note 395) While that power is often used by Masters in this jurisdiction in relation to
small items such as time summonses, (Note 396) its use is otherwise highly exceptional, with only a few judges being inclined
to make such assessments. (Note 397) In contrast, summary assessments under the CPR are extensively made and widely
regarded as a real deterrent against unnecessary and unmeritorious interlocutory
applications. |
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453. |
The relevant provisions include the following
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453.1 |
CPR 43.3 defines "summary
assessment" as "the procedure by which the court, when making an order about
costs, orders payment of a sum of money instead of fixed costs or 'detailed
assessment'." |
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453.2 |
CPR 44.7 gives the court a general option of
ordering either a summary or detailed assessment. However, the associated practice
direction provides that the court should, as a rule, make a summary assessment of the
costs where the hearing has lasted not more than one day, unless there is good reason not
to do so. (Note 398) |
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453.3 |
Accordingly, the parties, who are under a duty
to help the judge make a summary assessment, must come to the hearing prepared with a
signed schedule showing the costs he intends to claim and containing the prescribed
details. (Note 399) |
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453.4 |
The rules seek to ensure that the client is
made aware of any such order made. By CPR 44.2 :- |
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(a) |
the court makes a costs
order against a legally represented party; and |
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(b) |
the party is not
present when the order is made, |
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the party's solicitor
must notify his client in writing of the costs order no later than 7 days after the
solicitor receives notice of the order." |
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454. |
The Practice Direction on Appeals indicates
that summary assessment of costs is also likely to be used in the Court of Appeal in
certain cases and requires the parties to be prepared to deal with such an assessment.
(Note 400) |
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(b) |
Moving away from "costs follow the
event" |
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455. |
In championing the widespread use of summary
assessments, Lord Woolf consciously moved away from the principle, still pervasively
applicable in Hong Kong, that the costs should generally follow the event. |
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455.1 |
Under that principle, the party who turns out
to be the loser after trial is basically considered responsible for all the costs. It is
considered fair that the costs should "follow the event" and be ordered against
the losing party since he is, after all, the wrongdoer, whose wrongdoing made the action
necessary. |
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455.2 |
In line with that principle, even where the
ultimately victorious party misbehaves procedurally at an interlocutory stage, the court
tends not to exact payment from him then and there, but allows the parties to settle their
respective costs liabilities at the final taking of accounts. The winner is then able to
set off what he owes in interlocutory costs against the trial award, including the overall
costs award. |
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456. |
While there is obviously logic in the
abovementioned approach, the practice of allowing parties to defer until the end of the
case payment of costs orders made against them in interlocutory applications can be
criticised as lacking in realism and as doing little to curb interlocutory excesses. Lord
Woolf reported that many respondents to his Interim Report asked for more effective costs
sanctions against parties using interlocutory applications as tactics. (Note 401) |
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457. |
Faced with an order to pay the costs of the
interlocutory hearing "in any event", ie, whichever party ultimately wins, but
payable only at the end of the case, the party or the legal advisers concerned are
unlikely to be deterred from making similar interlocutory applications since the financial
impact of the order may well never be felt. Liability "in any event" tends to
look a long way off. Even if the case does not settle, the order may eventually be set off
against other costs orders or may simply be aggregated with a larger liability. In either
case, the costs order makes no impact as a specific financial sanction at the
interlocutory stage. |
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458. |
As the available figures demonstrate, the vast
majority of cases do not go to trial but are disposed of at some earlier stage, by
settlement or otherwise. Where the case settles, earlier costs orders tend to be swept up
in the settlement and are again never felt as individual sanctions. |
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459. |
Things take on a very different complexion if
a speculative or ill-advised interlocutory application leads to an order immediately
requiring the client (or, in a wasted costs situation, the adviser) to reach for his
cheque book in order to pay a sum to the other side, whatever the ultimate outcome of the
case. |
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(c) |
Reaction to summary assessment of costs |
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460. |
Publication of Lord Woolf's proposal for use
of summary assessment as a sanction against unjustified interlocutory applications met
with a favourable response in Hong Kong. Professor Wilkinson thought this would be a good
idea, (Note 402) as did
Mr Justice Waung. (Note 403) Mr Ronny Tong SC, when chairman of the Bar Association, stated :- |
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"In our view, our
rules can be easily amended and updated in such a way as to encourage more 'fixed costs'
orders and to facilitate more immediate enforcement and payment of such orders. Our courts
should also be given a flexible power to order immediate taxation and payment of costs
orders in complicated and lengthy applications. We do not see great difficulties in
modelling our new rules in this regard upon the Civil Procedure Rules in England
supplemented perhaps by a provision or Practice Direction that the parties do reveal their
costs in their skeleton submissions to the Court." (Note 404) |
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461. |
After a period of operation, the reaction to
summary assessment of costs in England and Wales has been more mixed. |
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461.1 |
In the personal injury context, Mr Geoffrey
Reed expressed the view last year that summary assessment of costs was not working well :- |
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"Preparation of
costs schedules is not a simple and straightforward task. It is often quite time
consuming. So very often the costs orders made at the hearing render the costs schedule
inappropriate regardless of the outcome of the application. It is often very difficult to
separate the costs of the application from the costs of the Action generally." (Note 405) |
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461.2 |
Also looking at the first year's operation,
Freshfields reported some initial complaints of an inconsistent judicial approach, (Note 406) but went on to state :- |
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"Preliminary
indications from the courts (including the specialist lists) are that the summary
assessment provisions have discouraged litigants and their lawyers from making obstructive
or time-wasting applications, and that this is one of the most productive areas of the
reforms in terms of its immediate effect on litigants' behaviour. It is also popular with
many litigants, who are opting for summary assessment in order to recover some proportion
of their costs immediately even though in some cases they might obtain a greater sum if
they proceeded to detailed assessment." (Note 407) |
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461.3 |
Reviewing two years' experience of the Woolf
reforms, Mr Harry Anderson concluded that summary assessment is a qualified success. It
has had a salutary effect on spurious applications but the operation of the rule has not
been consistent. (Note 408) |
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461.4 |
The Lord Chancellor's Department's evaluation
of the first two years acknowledges that these rules have provoked controversy, commenting
:- |
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"Commentators are
unsure as to whether the costs are fair and how difficult it is for judges to make an
informed assessment." (Note
409) |
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However, it expresses the view that "it
is likely that [the controversy] will decrease over time as judges and practitioners
become more familiar with the new rules." (Note 410) |
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462. |
Problems of inconsistency are encountered in
every context in which costs are awarded. This may be exacerbated in the context of
summary assessment of costs first, because the judge, at least initially, will lack
expertise in assessing costs; and secondly because the procedure is a summary one,
requiring a rough and ready approach. Nonetheless, initial inconsistencies do not appear
to be a good reason for rejecting summary assessment, which has otherwise proved an
effective deterrent to unjustified interlocutory applications. |
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462.1 |
As discussed later, one response to the
problem of inconsistency is, if possible, to prepare and publish a periodically revised
table of benchmark costs for the guidance of all concerned. This has encountered delays in
England and Wales due to difficulty in getting reliable information as to costs. (Note 411) However, assuming that such figures can be produced, less inconsistency can be
expected. |
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462.2 |
Even without benchmark costs, the development
of consistency in judicial decisions (whether as to levels of sentencing, of costs awards
or otherwise) is achievable over time through judicial conferences and other forms of
continuing judicial education. |
Notes
395 |
"The Court in
awarding costs to any person may direct that, instead of taxed costs, that person shall be
entitled ...... to a gross sum so specified in lieu of taxed costs [with special
provisions in respect of litigants in person]." <back> |
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396 |
In July 2001, a list of
proposed awards by way of "lump sum assessment" was issued by the Masters for
adoption on a voluntary and experimental basis. They cover costs for such matters as
simple charging orders nisi and absolute, mortgagee actions and garnishee proceedings.
Parties are invited to adopt the figures and so avoid any taxation, or to agree to a
summary assessment putting forward alternative figures. They may otherwise opt for a full
taxation. <back> |
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397 |
HKCP 2001,
62/9/10. <back> |
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398 |
44PD §13.2. <back> |
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399 |
44PD §13.5. <back> |
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400 |
52PD §14.1. <back> |
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401 |
WFR, p 83, §23. <back> |
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402 |
W&B, pp
32-34. <back> |
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403 |
W&B, p 203. <back> |
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404 |
W&B, p 192. <back> |
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405 |
Geoffrey Reed, Review
of the Civil Procedure Rules from the Perspective of a Defendant Personal Injury Lawyer
[2000] JPIL 13, 18. <back> |
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406 |
"The Civil
Justice Reforms One Year On - Freshfields Assess their Progress" M Bramley &
A Gouge (Butterworths, London 2000), p 153. <back> |
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407 |
Ibid, p
154. <back> |
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408 |
Harry Anderson,
Conference on "Civil Procedure: Latest Developments and Prospects of Change"
Hong Kong on 8 June 2001. <back> |
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409 |
EF, §7.9. <back> |
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410 |
EF, §7.3. <back> |
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411 |
EF §7.8 <back> |
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